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Abstract
The medical support for the coordinated effort for Harris County
Texas (Houston) to rescue evacuees from New Orleans following
Hurricane Katrina was part of an integrated collaborative network.
Both public health and operational health care was structured to
custom meet the needs of the evacuees and to create an exit
strategy for the clinic and shelter. Integrating local hospital and
physician resources into the Joint Incident Command was essential.
Outside assistance, including federal and national resources must
be coordinated through the local incident command.
A small group of thoughtful people could change the





A significant archive of written material on disasters exists,
much of it in literature that clinicians do not read [1–8]: in
city, state, federal and organizational documents and
brochures; in military and technical brochures; and in course
material for a relatively small group of international
responders who go to areas after a disaster to assist with
recovery efforts, medical care, and support. During the acute
phases of any emergency, local civic leaders, sheltering
organizations, and health professionals respond to help save
lives and preserve property when possible [9–12]. It is logical
that these forces, resources, philosophies, and personalities
would both interact and ‘clash’ during a major disaster [13].
Such was the case during and following Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita in August/September 2005.
The reports surrounding hurricane Katrina with regard to the
levees, flooding, and prolonged human tragedy on rooftops,
in isolated hospitals, the Convention Center, and the
Superdome have been retold to the point of saturation and
need not be repeated. This article focuses on the initiation,
planning, logistics, implementation, and exit strategy for
movement of trapped, hungry, thirsty, and ill persons from
(initially the Superdome) New Orleans to the Reliant
Astrodome complex (Reliant AstroCity) in Houston. Also, a
brief description of the role of critical care and trauma
physicians in such an effort is given, and the trauma and
critical care health challenges relating to this disaster are
addressed. A few key points and lessons are cited. Finally, as
this manuscript was being completed, hurricane Rita
threatened Houston/Galveston at category 5 forces and an
anticipated sea surge of 25 feet. Despite its ‘13th hour’ turn
away from Houston, massive preparations were put into
action, including the evacuation of in excess of 2.7 million
persons over a time frame of 72–96 hours. Houston then
served as the dispatch point for restoration of services to the
Beaumont/Lake Charles area and distribution center for
needed fuel trucks to automobile arteries across Southeast
Texas. Lessons learned from the management of these events
serve as the basis of this review.
Overriding governing principles for medical
reaction to disaster preparedness and response
More than 4000 articles on medical response to hurricanes
can be found in peer-reviewed journals, with more than
10,000 articles on ‘disaster’ related topics in published
literature. Numerous books, monographs, and documents
exist. From representative articles and chapters, a resume of
overriding governing principles for medical planning,
response, support, and involvement can be constructed.
• Less than 10% of the challenges faced during a disaster
are medical.
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• Only 10% of persons who arrive at a hospital or shelter
following a disaster are in need of acute medical
attention.
• Only 10% of those presenting to a shelter clinic or a
hospital following a disaster have a potentially life-
threatening condition.
• Communications are essential but are always a challenge.
• All disaster response is local (at least for the first
48–96 hours).
• The time, effort, and expense needed to transport out-of-
state doctors and nurses into the area is rarely justified or
needed, especially during the first 48–96 hours.
• All outside assistance and resources should be locally
coordinated and arranged at the local level, because that
is where the knowledge base for need is most reliable.
• Most successes or failures in disaster response are
determined within the first 36 hours.
• Local leadership always emerges, although it often is not
part of prior preparedness exercises and drills.
• Federal (top down) programs are primarily politically
driven and are fraught with red tape, regulation, time
delays, and frustration.
• Most major disasters do not involve an acute need for a
significant volume of surgical and procedural expertise.
• For a shelter population of less than 5000 evacuees, an
on-site clinic is not required or necessary.
• Every population has an indigent population segment.
• Integrated, collaborative networks with intrinsic local
discipline, support, and assignment of responsibility
represent the most effective planning and action model.
• Examples of integrated collaborative networks exist and
should be replicated to optimize disaster response.
Rescue to Houston: Katrina
By Tuesday, 30 August 2005, the media informed the world
that thousands of people were trapped in a sub-sea-level
bowl – the city of New Orleans. Some were trapped in
buildings surrounded by water, others were stranded on
rooftops, while still others were trapped where they had
sought refuge, namely the Superdome and the New Orleans
Convention Center. Normal communications were not
working, Internet connections were nonfunctional, and cell
phone connections were intermittent and infrequent, and so
completely unreliable. Information on the number and
condition of people in the various hospitals and the
rudimentary shelters was incomplete at best and completely
inaccurate at worst [14,15].
During the early morning hours of Wednesday, 31 August
2005, the Governors of Louisiana and Texas communicated
with the County Judge of Harris County, and Mayor of
Houston, Texas, and a plan to move evacuees from the
Superdome to the Astrodome was established. By
09:00 hours on Wednesday, 35 individuals from state,
county, and city agencies, and many local organizations met
to address the mission. Members of the group were already
known to each other from routine daily interaction,
participation in previous disaster drills, or actual management
of major disasters in the Greater Houston area (upward of
25% of anything that the Federal Emergency Management
Agency [FEMA] classifies as a disaster occurs in Harris
County, Texas) [16].
A mission statement was agreed, and six working groups
were established for logistics, operations, contributions,
volunteers, placement and employment, and medical. Each
group was given assignments and told to develop a strategy
and plan for implementation, and to bring only success
reports to a meeting to be held 6 hours later. Excuses for
outstanding deliverables were not an option.
The medical group, comprising four physicians and two
administrators, was to support the mission by screening
evacuees as they arrived, provide a triage area at each sleep
area containing up to 25,000 persons, inspect food, and
establish a nearby ‘clinic’, complete with electronic medical
record, complete laboratory, pharmacy, and radiology, and
most specialties of medicine. Significant support for mental
health, special needs patients, eyeglasses, and surveillance
for infectious disease was established. The team predicted
the number and type of medical, social, mental health and
related conditions, and the space and personnel required to
accomplish this task. The planning for these missions took
4–6 hours, and the customized clinic was in place in
12 hours. This was accomplished by using existing
collaborative networks among the Baylor College of
Medicine, community physician members of the Harris County
Medical Society, and the infrastructure and networks of the
Harris County Hospital District (HCHD). A fourth level of
health care was to be provided by area hospitals for patients
whose conditions were outside the capability of the Katrina
Clinic. In addition, the medical group was responsible for food
inspection, sanitation, public health, environmental health,
immunizations, and credentialing of volunteer physicians,
nurses, and PAs. The group also determined to look after the
‘mental health’ of the incident command group and others
providing leadership and service during the incident.
A shelter cannot and should not exist indefinitely. From the first,
the command staff planned for an exit strategy – a time for the
shelter and its clinic and other supportive functions to cease to
exist. As most disaster shelters do not have an intrinsic clinic,
we planned to keep the clinic open only 2 weeks or until the
Reliant AstroCity population reached 3000, whichever
occurred first. We targeted 17 days from opening date to have
all evacuees out of the Reliant AstroCity and in more
permanent settings. From day 1, these targets were shared
with the media and all of the collaborative network partners.
Our new Reliant AstroCity citizens (evacuees) were informed
of our vision and told that we would have educational, housing,
and job fair opportunities – an infrastructure to assist them in
beginning new lives. The evacuees themselves became part ofPage 3 of 6
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the exit strategy. One aspect of addressing future mental health
problems and depression was to integrate the evacuees into
the process and into the same kind of ‘can do’ mentality of our
plan and exit strategy.
The six members of the medical group were required not only
to expedite the plans for the clinic and ‘missions’, but also to
serve as local, regional, and national communicators of our
mission, timeline and implementation to the medical
profession, professional institutions and organizations, press,
general public, and evacuees. This was accomplished by
having a member of the medical group on the podium at each
press conference, coordinating the medical information with
the Joint Information Center, and neutralizing any mis-
information or incomplete information from ‘maverick’
physicians (or others) who did not have access to all of the
coordinated plans and actions. The disaster, emergency
medicine, surgical, critical care, and trauma Internet websites
were used to great advantage to imprint international readers
with the progress of the program. All of these activities were
successful in alerting the press and the community on what
to expect from a medical standpoint, even before an event
occurred (i.e. the diarrhea outbreak). In addition, the
physicians of the nation were extremely supportive of the
collaborative network of information, as well as the concept of
this program. When new and ‘out of the box’ support was
required, personal phone calls to appropriate agencies and
organizations, as well as via Internet and handheld
communication devices, were received with very positive
responses. During this process, the Joint Incident Command
was required to change the ‘game plan’ dozens of times
because original objectives given to the command staff often
changed as a result of local changes in numbers of evacuees
and availability of resources.
Through enfranchisement of each group, a military
management style that required all agencies to work through
the central command (all others to be considered maverick
activities), tight discipline, and ample security, a shelter –
complete with an extensive clinic – was in place receiving
evacuees approximately 18 hours from the time when the
central command was assembled. Each member of the
central command developed their integrated networks, and
each in turn was empowered to develop tertiary integrated
linkages. Actions of each group had an influence on all other
group activities, and careful records allowed for review,
accountability, and subsequent requests for funding.
Regardless of the altruism of any maverick group (i.e. groups
functioning outside the parameters of the command center),
their activities were eliminated. These maverick groups
included some unnecessary and/or redundant medically
related activities, which seemed to appear mysteriously on a
daily basis and, at times, were totally counter to the mission
and plan of the central command. Medical personnel who
wished to volunteer were scheduled into the approved
medical activities.
Key decisions of the medical group
The medical group and directors under the command group
negotiated more than a thousand decision nodes each day.
However, a few key decisions were the most important in
ensuring that this operation was successful.
• The clinic was located in a building adjacent to but
separate from the shelter buildings, which allowed for
expansion, storage, and development of a large isolation
area when required.
• As evacuees exited vehicles bringing them into Reliant
AstroCity, nurses, PAs and/or paramedics identified
patients with critical care conditions, and they were
immediately taken to the clinic.
• A medical director was appointed and empowered to
make independent but integrated decisions and was
supported at the highest levels. This medical director was
a member of the joint incident command staff and invited
to attend the three daily briefing meetings.
• Total absence of narcotics, including methadone, at the
shelter clinic site was mandated.
• Health care practioneers, including physicians, were
subject to credentialing and confirmation of licensure. No
‘maverick’ clinical activities were allowed.
• Medical personnel were scheduled in a ‘staff to volume’
ratio, eliminating excessive numbers of ‘medical voyeurism’.
• All press releases were cleared by the Joint Information
Center, including medical comments relating to all
medical branch responsibilities. The medical spokes-
persons could utilize local professional expertise for special
detailed information, but independent, contradictory and/or
discouraging comments to the press were not approved or
tolerated by the Joint Information Center.
• By day 10, any patient sent to an area hospital emergency
room from the Katrina clinic was treated in the same way
as all other Harris County/Houston patients seeking care
at that Emergency Center.
• Developing an ‘end game’ for when the clinic should be
closed and how to provide customary community health
care for evacuees was critical.
Steps on setting up the clinic
Although at least four integrated locations existed to evaluate
and treat the evacuees, the clinic made the success of the
other locations possible. The existing collaborating medical
networks in place in Houston were rapidly enlisted and
mobilized on the day before the clinic opened [3,17–23]. The
HCHD was already managing 10 community-based clinics
for populations approximating 25,000 each. The Vice Chair of
Baylor College of Medicine’s Department of Family and
Community Medicine was selected to serve as the Medical
Director of the Reliant AstroCity Clinic. He contacted his
department to assist in personnel resources. An administrator
from the HCHD contacted the key hospital/clinic support
structures such as nursing, administration, medical records,
medical affairs, security, supply, laboratory, and others.
Available online http://ccforum.com/content/10/1/205Because of difficulty in obtaining a DMAT (disaster medical
assistance team) cache of pharmaceuticals, the HCHD
brought their own cache until an arrangement could be made
with the local pharmaceutical company, CVS, which brought
in a complete pharmacy housed in a large trailer. Baylor
College of Medicine’s Chair of Radiology requested and
received a donation of a computerized imaging system from
the company Siemens. The images were then transmitted via
picture archiving and communications system (PACS) to the
Ben Taub General Hospital. Medical volunteers were
requested from Baylor College of Medicine and the Harris
County Medical Society; the response from both was
overwhelming, and by 1 day into the operation physicians
were scheduled throughout the next 2 weeks. Nursing and
supportive personnel volunteers were also scheduled
throughout clinic operations, again with an overwhelming
response.
Existing collaborative agencies, institutions, organizations,
companies, offices, and volunteers made this almost
immediate ‘turnkey’ clinic possible. Initially, some barriers
existed, such as a need to have broadband capability for
computer and medical record, and professional credentialing
linkages. The same was true for the PACS transmission for
radiologic images. Potential barriers existed initially regarding
the pharmacy, case management, and nursing home
placement. As an obstacle was noted, it was addressed, and
whatever measures were needed were taken in an incredible
collaborative mode. It took a couple of days to establish
programs relating to chronic alcoholism and drug addiction,
but these were eventually addressed.
During the 15 days of operation, the clinic had 11,245 patient
visits, filled 16,622 prescriptions, gave 6318 vaccinations,
and sent 900 patients to area hospitals, approximately 10%
of whom were admitted. Twenty-five people who relocated to
Greater Houston because of the hurricane died during the
time when the clinic was open. Only four of these had been in
the Reliant AstroCity area at any time, two of whom had been
sent to area hospitals from the clinic and two who were never
seen in the clinic. All four died of natural causes.
… and then came Rita
Three days after we closed the clinic at the Reliant AstroCity
and on the target day for complete shutdown of all shelter
operations, we learned that Hurricane Rita was predicted to
hit the Galveston/Houston area at a category 5 force with a
25-foot sea surge. An incident command staff was
assembled and a new strategy was developed. For this
incident, we faced the need for evacuation of 2.7 million
people from danger prone locations. At this time, the homes,
hotels, and secondary shelters were already saturated with
people displaced by Hurricane Katrina. Public officials were
faced with the task of evacuating a large volume of people
rapidly, but learned (sometimes the hard way) that movement
by private automobiles cannot be accomplished in less than
several days. The challenges and need for public information
and allocation of resources were different from those with the
Katrina rescue, but the management collaborative networking
and leadership requirements were virtually identical.
Top down disaster preparedness and
management
A ‘top down’ management strategy assumes a centrist
philosophy and regulation to proscribe subordinate structure
to follow a preset list of rules and actions. With larger
populations, those establishing the often algorithmic
regulations are almost always distanced from the ‘local’
implementers and those directly involved in the central
interpretation of what is best and how it can/should be
accomplished. For many centrist approaches, the solution is
to provide policy and money, which is often separate from the
ability to understand the local ramifications or logistics.
Many hospital and even private citizen group disaster plans
and responses have been written from the philosophy of a
top down management concept. These are political, sluggish,
and awkward, and often disregard local incident command
programs and local resources. Top down disaster
preparedness concepts have dominated the textbooks and
articles on disasters, mass casualty, and terrorism for more
than 45 years. Literally hundreds of independent citizens, and
state, federal, and organizational disaster groups exist, each
with its centrist theme, and with very little integration, cross-
communication, or collaborative networking.
Medical collaborative network opportunities
Integrated networks are best exemplified by the Internet. The
many component parts can be described and are known,
while overriding standards exist to allow integration. The
power is in individual computers and servers, and the
collaboration is accomplished via common services, list
servers, websites, and addresses. Thus, members of a critical
care list server (i.e. Critical Care Medicine – list) have a
common purpose, basically know each other, and have a web
master, but the daily integration of ideas allows for the
collaborative network. The American Red Cross is able to
have a centrist organization, but it also has regional and local
chapters that participate in fundraising, donations, and
supervision of shelters. The local infrastructure gives this
organization its power, and its functionality occurs at the local
collaborative level. Both the professional group on the
Internet and the American Red Cross often respond to a new
idea, new challenge, or new opportunity at literally a
moment’s notice. Collaborative networks are able to
accomplish this system requirement.
The nation’s Trauma System Network, manifest by level I, II,
and III trauma centers, is another example of such an
integrated collaborative network. During activities in response
to both Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the trauma center
directors from Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas, New Mexico, and
Critical Care    Vol 10 No 1 Mattox
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type technology, and regularly communicated with the entire
group about caseload, supply needs, new disease outbreaks,
and patient movement. This corresponded to the pre-existing
network for the American College of Surgeons, Committee
on Trauma, Trauma Region VII. This network often provided
more accurate information than some of the cross-state
public safety agencies. Some states (i.e. Connecticut) have
used the existing and well organized Trauma System Network
as a foundation upon which to build the states’ Integrated
Collaborative Network for disaster planning and prepared-
ness. In that virtually every state has a mechanism for trauma
center verification in place, this trauma collaborative network
would seem to be a good place to start in coordinating
medical activities for disasters.
Early in the meandering course of Katrina, Doctor Norman
McSwain and I talked several times, knowing that Gulf
hurricanes are fickle and unpredictable. We were in contact
with surgeons throughout Region VII of the American
College of Surgeons Committee on Trauma. We developed
a mass mailing communication mechanism for us to share
information on numbers, diseases seen, trends in patient
flow and conditions, and aids in communication with our
colleagues in the local Joint Incident Command Center. This
network has been in place since the mid-1980s as part of
the state and regional trauma system of the American
College of Surgeons Committee on Trauma. In that the
trauma system of Louisiana was not tied into the state’s
disaster planning and response non-network, we were
unable to arrive at a timely decision regarding evacuation,
security, and medical support.
Although I recognize that hospitals, surgeons, emergency
physicians, emergency medical services personnel, and
public health physicians often write about and drill for a
variety of disaster conditions, most of these drills have no
similarity to real-time disasters because they are infrequently
and inadequately integrated in the manner required to
respond to a disaster like hurricane Katrina or Rita. These and
other disciplines provide valuable input during planning and
response, but physicians who are familiar with and
experienced in integrated collaborative networks are best
suited from a training and mind set management approach to
handle disasters.
The Local Incident Command is a joint organization structure
that can be a model of collaborative networking, while having
a local centrist command structure. The National Incident
Management System has been a training module under
homeland security to address this need, but it has excluded
the very medical providers that are so important ‘on the
ground’, in the hospital, and at the command post during a
disaster. New concepts in physician involvement, training,
and utilization are required for future National Incident
Management System panels [24–27].
Interpretation of future reports regarding
Katrina
Finally, view all ‘evidence-based’ reports from the Katrina
experience with a skeptical eye. There will be many, and I
would say that if ever there were a time to ‘consider the
source’, then this would be it. Those who were not involved
from day 1 of planning through to the very last day of the
Reliant AstroCity clinic probably know not of which they
speak. Many came into the situation days later, stayed briefly,
and came away with whatever their preconceived idea/intent
was. Therefore, be discerning and careful in reviewing ‘data’
collected, presented, and published. Noncollaborative, non-
networked reports will be plentiful, are self-serving and
misleading, and can produce data that can mislead future
planners. It is imperative that the collaborative network style
of management extends to data analysis and future disaster
planning and response.
Conclusion
The ability to mobilize resources depends on a pre-existing
local collaborative network. Such networks allow for a local
integrated incident command structure. The local response to
any disaster is more a function of management of people,
ideas, supplies, and strategies, and less a matter of practiced
drills for chemical, biologic, radiologic, and blast conditions.
Outside assistance, including policy, review, epidemiologic,
and economic, should be supportive of the local incident
command needs, rather than imposing a top down
management style on the local prepared response. Even the
local professional resources have integrated collaborative
networks that can be called in to assist in the emergency
disaster response. Future discussions on disaster
preparedness should focus on strengthening existing
integrated collaborative networks.
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